School Seminars and Colloquia

Resource Allocation in a Tactical Arms Race with Temporary Advantages

ORSUM Seminar

by Professor Boaz Golany


Institution: The Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Date: Fri 7th May 2010
Time: 1:00 PM
Location: Room 213, Richard Berry Building, The University of Melbourne

Abstract: We consider an arms race between two opponents (e.g., government forces vs. insurgents) where each advantage that is achieved by one of the opponents is limited in time and expires when the other opponent develops a new weapon or counter-measure (in contrast with the "winner-takes-all"
situation that characterizes much of the literature on investments in competitive business environments). We first consider a variety of models that apply to a one-sided situation, where the defender has to determine how much to invest in developing counter-measures to a weapon employed by the attacker. The decision problems are expressed as (convex) nonlinear optimization problems. We present an example that provides some operational insights regarding optimal resource allocation. We also consider a two-sided situation and develop a Nash equilibrium solution that sets investment values so that both parties have no incentive to change.

For More Information: contact: Dr Christina Burt. email: c.burt@ms.unimelb.edu.au